

SPAM: 101 Cause and Effect



Table of Contents

- ✍ Background: JARING
- ✍ SPAM 101
- ✍ Effects
- ✍ Lesson Learned
- ✍ Challenges and Propositions



Part I: Background on JARING

(We're the good guys.)



What is JARING?

- ✍ The first ISP in Malaysia (1992: 28 subscribers).
- ✍ Today: 800,000 subscribers
- ✍ Services:-
 - ✍ Dial Up, Office Broadband, Wireless Broadband, Dedicated Access, Secure VPN, VOIP
 - ✍ Secure Internet Data Centre, Web Hosting, Firewall Solution, E-mail.
- ✍ $6 * /16, 2 * /17, 1 * /18 = 475,136$ addresses
- ✍ 8% is allocated for dynamic IP addresses



Part II: SPAM 101

(A lot of good things, just focusing on one of the not so good ones, with spammers mostly.)



What is Spam and Malware in E-Mail Context?

- ✍ Definitions in the context of JARING E-Mail Service:-
- ✍ Spam: Unsolicited, bulk mail operations. Examples:-
 - ✍ Mails duplicated and sent to a high percentage of users, sometimes in a distributed fashion
 - ✍ Dictionary attacks launched to harvest working ISP e-mail addresses
- ✍ Malware: Unsolicited mail with virus or worm attached to it.
 - ✍ Normally a seasonal phenomena
 - ✍ Sizable increase of malware in mails in 2004.



Incoming Spam: Impacts to ISPs

- ✎ Waste of Resources: 50-80% of e-mail traffic is Spam.
- ✎ Difficulty of Management: E-mail traffic has spikes, i.e. seasonal malware attacks (MyDoom, Bagle, Netsky).
- ✎ Performance Impact: performance hit in delivering, fetching and managing mails.
- ✎ Inconvenience/Nuisance to customers: A JARING E-mail account receives on average 5-20 spam e-mails per day, depending on popularity of e-mail address in spammers' databases.



Incoming Spam: How do ISPs get spammed?

- ✎ Spammers or malware harvest addresses by collecting published / semi-published information using multiple harvesting techniques:-
 - ✎ Collect e-mail addresses from websites
 - ✎ Collect e-mail addresses from newsgroups
 - ✎ Collect e-mail addresses from mailing list archives
 - ✎ Fake mails to ISPs to collect probably active e-mail addresses (dictionary attacks).
- ✎ Spam gets sent from:-
 - ✎ Spammer-friendly networks (i.e. networks in blocklists)
 - ✎ Compromised systems by crackers or malware (increasing!)



Outgoing/Linked Spam:

How do ISP networks get enlisted into SPAM and Anti SPAMMER's database

- ✍ Hosts machines vulnerable to intrusions and exploits by crackers and/or spammers:-
 - ✍ Open Relay/Proxy: mis-configured / worm-infected host which allows anyone, anywhere to send mail to any address in the Internet.
 - ✍ Mis-configured open relays/proxies: often occur in leased line customers who run their own mail or proxy servers.
 - ✍ Worm-infected open relays: often occur in individual dial-up or broadband users, i.e. dynamic IP range.



Part III: Effects



Enlistment into Anti-SPAMMER's database

☞ "Spamvertizing". Example: JARING's past SPEWS entry:-

☞ SPEWS evidence S2062: the 2 parties:-

☞ PERPAY-TWO (PerPay.com / PerPay Sdn Bhd):-


- JARING delegated 61.6.67.88 – 61.6.67.95 range
- Range used to host DNS records for Bullet9 (ns1.exubient.com),
- Range used to host web space for spammer, i.e. "spamvertizing": [http://www.wwe-course.com/...](http://www.wwe-course.com/)-
- The URL is linked to in spam mails.
- Basically hosts more information / supporting system for the products and services being advertised by spammers.

☞ Bullet9 (Bullet9 Communications):-


- Major spammer web hosting and bulk mail advertiser, with resources in Malaysia and Russia).




July 2003: Listing in Popular Blocklists (Countries)




July 2003: Addresses in Popular Blocklists (Countries)




JARING Incident Reports (2003)



JARING Incident Reports (2004)



JARING Spam Incident Reports (2004)



Part IV: Lessons Learned

"Experience is a harsh teacher. It first gives you the test then the lesson."



What Really Happened?

- ✍ In February 2003, 4 new accounts started operating under 2 company names.
- ✍ 2 more accounts started operating in May and June 2003, each under 2 different companies.
- ✍ During these periods, spam complaints shot up, and each company were dealt with separately (given ample time to respond, 2nd chances, etc).
- ✍ We monitored and found out in July 2003 that all these companies are actually the same spammer using spam-vertised mode.
- ✍ Suspended them immediately, and started termination process.
- ✍ Finally removed from SPEWS October 2003.



How did we get delisted?

- ✍ Only people behind SPEWS knows.
- ✍ But what we did was:-
 - ✍ Trace spamvertising accounts (6) to their root (identified as one spammer), and blacklist the person.
 - ✍ “Clean up” our networks from these accounts: Suspend+disconnect them immediately, then terminate them.
 - ✍ Renew AUP, improve and detail out antis spam enforcements.
 - ✍ <http://www.jaring.my/corporate/aup/index.html>



I thought we are handling spam cases?

- ✍ Current processes were inadequate. Examples:-
 - ✍ Inadequate policy, its enforcements and awareness, especially to downstream providers / hosting companies.
 - ✍ Many customers are unaware of how to handle spamming cases in networks delegated to them
 - ✍ Some are not sensitive to spam, i.e. subscribe to spammers' services to promote their products and services
 - ✍ Meanwhile, antis spam community, especially blacklist maintainers, push for ISPs to play much greater role in ensuring that all their customers networks are “spam-source-free”. (i.e. no open relays, spammers, worm-infected hosts, etc).
 - ✍ Spammers are terminated, but able to register again.
 - ✍ Global spammer networks like Bullet9 possibly have agents in Malaysia, registering company names used to hop around JARING (and other ISPs) networks.



Action #1: AUP Review

✍ Previous AUP (Terms and Conditions):-

✍ You agree not to use the Forums or any other service provided by JARING to:

✍ b) Upload, post, e-mail, publish, transmit or distribute any material containing any unsolicited or unauthorized advertising, promotions, surveys, junk mail, chain letters, pyramid schemes, or any other form of solicitation of goods and services;

✍ Needed stronger emphasis and detail.

✍ Published and Enforced new AUP:-

✍ <http://www.jaring.my/corporate/aup/index.html>



Action #2: Improve Enforcements (Part 1)

✍ Be strict:-

✍ Terminate customers who are proven to spam at first proven record of spam, i.e. no second chances (Exceptions: genuine negligence such as open relay).

✍ Be thorough:-

✍ Monitor posting in blocklists, NANAE and NANAS, and take action on them ASAP.

✍ Maintain own terminated companies / CEOs / contact persons responsible for spammer accounts, to be used for background checks on each new account, and made available to public, or at least all downstream providers.



Action #2: Improve Enforcements (Part 2)

- ✍ Be proactive:-
 - ✍ Downstream providers / hosting companies must be required to employ at least the same standards as JARING in terms of abuse management and policy enforcements
 - ✍ Maintain awareness among the downstream admins, i.e. set up mailing list for abuse-related discussions and announcements.



Action #3: Review Registration Process

- ✍ Do background checks on ALL potential corporate customers:-
 - ✍ Check company details, profile, key persons, etc. against JARING blocklist database
 - ✍ Check for any current or past affiliation with major global spammers like bullet9 or others found in Spamhaus's ROKSO database.
- ✍ If potential customer is a provider / hosting company, ensure they are aware of their responsibilities etc. as in our AUP and abuse management policies.



Action #4: Technical Preventive Steps

- ✍ Re-arrange networks to distance different classes of users (avoid mixed dynamic and static ranges)
- ✍ For e-mail services: scan and remove as much malware and spam as feasibly possible at the e-mail gateway (MX) level, while minimizing false positives and provide as much control to the customer as feasibly possible.
- ✍ **Monitor smtp traffic for spikes and spam patterns, and alert standby personnel for verification. Block the spamming host if verified.**
- ✍ **Monitor other traffic and resources (e.g. newsgroups) for spam instances attributed to the ISP.**



Part V: Challenges and Propositions



Challenge #1: Spammers Are Still Here

- ✍ **JARING booted them out, but they move to other ISPs. Watch out! Check for your ISP range in blocklists.**



Spam prevention

- ✍ Spam filter
- ✍ Policies and framework
- ✍ Laws and regulation



Proposition #1: ISPs Unite Against Spammers

✍ Proposition: ISPs need to work together! Some suggestions of what we have to maintain:-

- ✍ A shared resource among Asian ISPs, or at least among local ISPs, of blacklisted customers (companies, individuals, etc).
- ✍ A shared “whitelist” networks (ISP architecture networks, for exceptions in each others' blocklists)
- ✍ Publish ISP's dynamic IP range (for blocking certain activities such as direct-to-MX)
- ✍ Raise awareness / enforce security on users (e.g. audit customer networks and notify).



Proposition #2: Stronger Antispam Legislation

✍ Stronger policies, e.g.:-

- ✍ <http://www.jaring.my/corporate/aup/index.html>
- ✍ Proposition: Work with regulators to discuss ways to close holes exploited by spammers (after termination, registering as some other company under someone else's name).
- ✍ Include Spam as part of Cyber Crime.
- ✍ ISPs and regulators work together with international antispam efforts, to regain back the country's tarnished reputation w.r.t. Spam.



Proposition #3: Education, Education

- ✍ The actions outlined in new policies require educating every level within the ISP organisation:-
 - ✍ Enforcers
 - ✍ Sales
 - ✍ Technical
 - ✍ Downstream providers
 - ✍ End users
- ✍ Customer/User Education also vital: e.g. FAQs on spam and other security issues.
 - ✍ (<http://www.jaring.my/corporate/aup/index.html>)
- ✍ Raise awareness on other areas prone to spam (mobile, fax, phone, etc).



Thank You.

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